Chapter 26, Disaster cards: 27 types in quick reference
How to use. Each card fits on two pages. Print the ones that correspond to the risks of your territory. In a crisis situation, open the card, follow the actions in order. Do not read, execute.
Index of the 27 cards
The cards are sorted into six families. Each code (A1, B2, etc.) refers to the matching card in the following pages.
Family A, Geological
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| A1 |
Earthquake |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| A2 |
Tsunami |
Minutes to hours |
| A3 |
Volcanic eruption |
Hours to days |
| A4 |
Landslide |
A few hours, sometimes no warning |
| A5 |
Avalanche |
Minutes (risk bulletin: daily) |
Family B, Meteorological
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| B1 |
Cyclone / hurricane / typhoon |
3 to 7 days |
| B2 |
Flood |
Hours to days |
| B3 |
Cold wave / snowstorm |
1 to 3 days |
| B4 |
Heat wave |
2 to 7 days |
| B5 |
Tornado |
Minutes (watch: hours) |
| B6 |
Dam / hydraulic structure failure |
None to a few minutes downstream |
Family C, Climate / environmental
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| C1 |
Drought |
Weeks to months |
| C2 |
Wildfire |
Hours, sometimes minutes |
| C3 |
Locust / pest invasion |
Weeks (FAO bulletins) |
Family D, Industrial / technological
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| D1 |
HAZMAT explosion / industrial accident |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D2 |
Nuclear / radiological accident |
Minutes to hours |
| D3 |
Major blackout |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D4 |
Mass transport accident |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D5 |
Building collapse (technological cause: defect, decay, overload) |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D6 |
Terrorist attack / mass violence |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D7 |
Crowd crush / stampede |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| D8 |
Cyberattack on essential infrastructure |
Instantaneous (delayed discovery) |
Family E, Health
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| E1 |
Epidemic / pandemic |
Days to weeks |
Family F, Human / societal
| Code |
Type |
Warning speed |
| F1 |
War / armed conflict |
Variable, often predictable |
| F2 |
Refugees / mass displacement |
Days to weeks |
| F3 |
Famine / food crisis |
Weeks to months |
| F4 |
Complex multi-hazard crisis |
Variable |
Tip. Do not print all 27 cards. Print only the 4 to 6 cards that match the risks mapped in chapter 3 for your territory, and slip them into the club's emergency kit.
A1, EARTHQUAKE
|
|
| Code |
A1, Family A: Geological |
| Speed |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| Lead time |
None |
| Duration |
Seconds (impact) + days to weeks (aftershocks) |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, major structural damage, broken networks |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify club buildings predating earthquake codes
- Drinking water stock: 3 L/person/day × 72 h, minimum vital (full Sphere standard is 15 L/day all uses, see chapter 4) + non-perishable food
- Train 2 members in first aid in unstable environments (CERT)
- Gathering points in open space, far from buildings
- Pre-identify structural engineers in the member network
- Call-down list from a secure open space
- DO NOT enter cracked buildings, aftershocks without warning
- Reach the gathering point, count members present/missing
- Assess damage from outside only (collapses, gas leaks, fires)
- Cut gas and electricity if accessible and safe
- Alert President + Disaster Coordinator by SMS (voice network saturated)
- Contact the District: escalate to DCA-2 or DCA-1 depending on scale, DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Aftershocks: A standing building can collapse during an aftershock. Never enter without structural inspection, even to retrieve belongings.
- Rush to the rubble: Untrained volunteers hinder USAR teams. Wait for instructions from authorities.
- Tap water: Cracked pipes = contaminated water. Distribute only bottled or treated water until sanitary certification.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Area assessment in pairs, open spaces |
Collective kitchens for victims + rescuers |
Light reconstruction (roofs, non-structural repairs) |
| Map collapses, cut-off routes |
Waiting lists for structural assessment (volunteer engineers) |
Support families toward government aid |
| Emergency drinking water distribution (pipes frequently broken) |
Volunteer rotations (physical and psychological fatigue) |
Global Grant reconstruction of schools/clinics to seismic standards |
| Outdoor shelters (ShelterBox, tarps), no reintegration without inspection |
Debris removal support if area is safe, otherwise logistics only |
Photo and financial documentation for TRF stewardship |
| Launch DRG (25,000 USD) with rapid assessment report |
Psychological support: people in shock |
|
| Contact ShelterBox (shelter kits) + WASH-RAG (latrines) |
Interim District report to adjust DRG or Global Grant |
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Water, shelters, emergency food |
48-72 h |
| ShelterBox |
Tents and family survival kits |
From D+1 |
| WASH-RAG |
Drinking water, emergency latrines |
From D+1 |
| DNA-RAG |
Coordination and technical expertise |
Immediate |
| Global Grant |
Reconstruction of schools/clinics |
3-6 months |
A2, TSUNAMI
|
|
| Code |
A2, Family A: Geological |
| Speed |
Extreme (wave: 500 to 800 km/h in open sea, slowing to 30-50 km/h near the coast, NOAA) |
| Lead time |
15-30 min (distant) to zero (local) |
| Duration |
2-8 hours (series of 3 to 7 waves) |
| Affected area |
Coastal, total destruction of low-lying areas, saline contamination of fresh water |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Know the tsunami inundation zones (official maps)
- Evacuation routes to high ground from each meeting location
- Train members on the local tsunami warning signal (sirens, apps)
- Pre-position bottled fresh water stocks at high altitude
- Upon alert or felt marine earthquake: immediate evacuation to high ground, without waiting for official confirmation
- DO NOT go to watch the sea, water receding announces the wave
- Gathering point at altitude: at least 30 m elevation or at least 1.5 to 3 km from the coast depending on local topography (NOAA, UNESCO IOC)
- DO NOT return to low-lying areas before the official alert is lifted by authorities (often several hours, sometimes more than a day; wave series spans 2-8 h)
- Call-down list from high ground
- Alert the District: potentially catastrophic situation, DRG anticipated
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Deadly curiosity: Observing the sea receding from the beach kills. Height and distance are the only protections.
- Returning too early: Secondary waves (less visible) have killed rescuers who returned after the first wave.
- Well water: Even when clear, coastal water is contaminated by salt and pathogens for weeks.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Damage assessment after water retreat confirmed by authorities |
Food distribution for displaced persons |
DO NOT rebuild in low-lying coastal area without official study |
| Bottled fresh water, absolute priority (coastal wells salted) |
Debris removal support in secure/dried areas |
Global Grant reconstruction of infrastructure on high ground |
| Distribution points on high ground outside flooded areas |
Recovery of lost official documents |
Rebuilding of boats/equipment for fishermen |
| Reception of coastal displaced on high ground |
Semi-permanent water purification (WASH-RAG) |
Tsunami education with local schools |
| WASH-RAG: urgent fresh water solutions |
Epidemiological surveillance (leptospirosis, cholera) |
|
| ShelterBox for homeless families |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Fresh water, shelters, food |
48-72 h |
| WASH-RAG |
Fresh water, purification |
From D+1 |
| ShelterBox |
Shelters for displaced families |
From D+2 |
| Global Grant |
Reconstruction outside risk zone |
3-6 months |
A3, VOLCANIC ERUPTION
|
|
| Code |
A3, Family A: Geological |
| Speed |
Variable (slow to explosive) |
| Lead time |
Hours to weeks (precursor signs: tremors, degassing) |
| Duration |
Days to several years |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, lava, lahars, ash, toxic gases (SO₂, CO₂) |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Know the official evacuation plan and exclusion zones
- Stock of FFP2/N95 masks (ash → silicosis)
- Identify crops and livestock of member farmers
- Bottled water reserve (ash makes rainwater acidic)
- Follow the evacuation orders of the volcanological authorities without discussion
- Help vulnerable persons evacuate the exclusion zone
- Distribute FFP2/N95 masks before evacuation
- Close shutters, doors, ventilation (slows ash penetration)
- Take animals with you or release them, do not stay for them
- Call-down list from a secure area outside the perimeter
- Alert District: potentially long duration, DRG from D+1
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Returning too early: Exclusion zones are scientific. Pyroclastic flows: 200 to 1,000 °C, average speed ~100 km/h, up to 700 km/h in extreme cases (USGS); no chance of surviving them.
- Insufficient masks: A surgical mask does not block fine ash. Only FFP2 / N95 filter at least 94% of 0.3 µm particles, making them effective against fine volcanic ash (PM2.5 included).
- Underestimating duration: Accommodation "for a few days" while evacuation lasts months. Build Global Grant from week 2.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3 days, months) |
Recovery (post-eruption) |
| Shelter centers for evacuees (plan for weeks, not days) |
Volunteer team rotation (eruption = months) |
Decontamination/cleaning of buildings |
| Respiratory masks for all + populations downwind |
Ash cleaning on roofs (collapse if > 10 cm) |
Global Grant water/irrigation systems |
| Bottled water (ash contaminates open reservoirs) |
Continuous drinking water (recontamination at each rainfall) |
Diversification of farmer livelihoods |
| Tarp water containers and cisterns |
Psychological support: ongoing uncertainty |
Gradual and secure return |
| Care for evacuated livestock |
Support for farmers (remaining crops, losses) |
|
| ShelterBox: evacuees for several weeks |
District report for Global Grant |
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Masks, water, shelters for evacuees |
48-72 h |
| ShelterBox |
Long-term housing for evacuees |
From D+2 |
| Global Grant |
Post-eruption water infrastructure |
3-6 months |
| ESRAG |
Soil rehabilitation |
Medium term |
A4, LANDSLIDE
|
|
| Code |
A4, Family A: Geological |
| Speed |
Instantaneous |
| Lead time |
None (possible precursor signs: ground cracking, tilting trees, cloudy water) |
| Duration |
Seconds (impact) + 24-72 h secondary risk |
| Affected area |
Local, slopes, exposed rural and urban areas |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify members living/working on risk slopes
- Know the precursor signs: ground cracking, tilting trees, cloudy water
- Rapid evacuation plan for identified risk areas
- Alert official rescue services first (GPS location)
- Safety perimeter: stay away from destabilized embankments and muddy areas
- Call-down list to identify potentially affected members
- DO NOT enter the mud zone without specialized equipment, risk of sinking
- Coordinate with the authorities to locate buried persons
- Alert the District: DCA depending on scale, DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Mud as a trap: Dense as fresh concrete. A volunteer sinks into it in seconds. Never alone, never without a safety rope.
- Secondary slides: 24-72 h after the main event, the slope remains unstable. New rain = new slides.
- Hasty reconstruction: Never rebuild on the initial site without an official geotechnical study.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery |
| Emergency shelter in secure areas off the slope |
Clearing road axes under authority supervision |
DO NOT rebuild without geotechnical study |
| Drinking water (local sources turbid/contaminated) |
Assessment of residual terrain stability |
Global Grant family relocation to stable ground |
| Communication of missing persons lists |
Psychological support: grief, loss of housing |
Reforestation/slope stabilization (ESRAG) |
| Logistical support to official search teams |
DRG documentation: photos, families, losses |
Advocacy for building standards in risk areas |
| Weather monitoring: rains = increased risk |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Shelter, water, logistics |
48-72 h |
| Global Grant |
Relocation, reforestation |
3-6 months |
| ESRAG |
Slope stabilization, reforestation |
Medium term |
A5, AVALANCHE
|
|
| Code |
A5, Family A: Geological (mass movement of snow) |
| Speed |
Sudden (triggered in seconds; front at 40-130 km/h for a dry-snow avalanche). European Avalanche Warning Services (EAWS) 5-level scale: 1 low, 2 moderate, 3 considerable, 4 high, 5 very high. Most fatal accidents occur at level 3 ("considerable"), not at the maximum level |
| Lead time |
The avalanche hazard bulletin (EAWS) is published daily in season; the release itself is instantaneous, with no local warning |
| Duration |
Seconds (impact) + a very short survival window under the snow: about 90% survival if extricated in under 15 minutes, then a sharp drop (asphyxia, hypothermia) |
| Affected area |
Local: gullies and slopes from 30° to 45°, mountain villages, high-altitude roads and railways, resorts. Areas concerned: Alps, Pyrenees, Andes, Himalayas, Rockies, Caucasus |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify the club's members and facilities located in a known avalanche gully (municipal zoning maps, PPRN in France)
- Circulate the reading of the EAWS bulletin and the rule: a level 3 "considerable" is already dangerous, do not wait for level 4-5
- Equip exposed members with the trio: avalanche transceiver + shovel + probe, and train them in searching; airbag pack for the most exposed
- List the local resources: ski patrollers, mountain gendarmerie/PGHM, avalanche dog handlers, rescue helicopter
- Plan a heated fallback point and a stock of survival blankets (hypothermia is the second killer after asphyxia)
- Immediately alert the official mountain rescue services (GPS location, presumed number of people buried)
- Rescuer safety: never send volunteers onto the slope as long as the risk of a secondary avalanche has not been lifted by the professionals. A second release kills the rescuers
- Support to rescuers: the vital factor is time; let the transceiver/dog teams work, provide logistics, lighting, rewarming of extricated victims
- Perimeter at the foot of the gully, keep onlookers away from the deposit zone (blocks of hardened snow)
- Call-down list to identify members potentially caught or present on site
- Alert the District: DCA depending on scale, DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- The secondary avalanche: after a first release, the slope above remains loaded. Sending volunteers to dig with bare hands often triggers a second, deadly release. Wait for the professionals to secure the area.
- Believing you have time: beyond 15 minutes of burial, survival collapses. Useful rescue happens before the rescue services arrive, so only by trained-and-equipped people already on site, never improvised.
- Underestimating level 3: most victims die at "considerable" risk, not "very high". Fine weather after a snowfall does not cancel the danger.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Logistical support to rescuers (rewarming, resupply, lighting) |
Housing for residents evacuated from threatening gullies |
Support with insurance and government aid |
| Psychological support for families during the search |
Gradual reopening of cut-off roads, in coordination with authorities |
Advocacy for avalanche barriers and buildable-land zoning (ESRAG) |
| Help rehousing households cut off from the world (closed roads) |
Coordination with the town hall and ski patrollers on sector closures |
Global Grant if collective facilities destroyed (school, high-altitude clinic) |
| Launch DRG with rapid assessment report |
Volunteer rotation (cold, altitude, fatigue) |
Stewardship, before/after photos |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Rehousing, rewarming, resupply of isolated persons |
48-72 h |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Intact neighboring valleys: logistical and housing relay |
Immediate |
| Club funds |
Immediate aid to bereaved or evacuated families |
Immediate |
| ESRAG |
Mountain resilience: avalanche barriers, slope reforestation |
Medium term |
B1, CYCLONE/HURRICANE/TYPHOON
|
|
| Code |
B1, Family B: Meteorological |
| Speed |
Progressive (approach) then brutal (impact) |
| Lead time |
3-7 days |
| Duration |
12-48 h (passage) + days to weeks (consequences) |
| Affected area |
Regional, winds > 120 km/h, storm surge, coastal and inland flooding |
BEFORE, Preparation (from alert, D-3 to D-7)
- Activate the club's emergency plan as soon as the cyclone alert is issued
- Contact the District immediately: DRG can be submitted BEFORE impact (only case)
- Alert DNA-RAG and ShelterBox (pre-positioning of stocks)
- Secure club premises, pre-position supplies (water, tarps, chainsaws, generators)
- Identify and contact members in flood-prone coastal areas
FIRST 6 HOURS, During the storm + post-impact
- Stay inside until the official end of the alert, DO NOT go out during the eye
- Maintain contact with the Disaster Coordinator by SMS, listen to radio
- As soon as the alert is lifted: damage assessment in pairs with PPE
- Tarping is an absolute priority: cover damaged roofs before the next rains
- Clearing circulation axes (trees, debris)
- Distribution of water, food, tarps to the most affected households
- Report to the District for DRG activation
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- The eye of the hurricane: Lull of 15-60 min. The storm resumes in the opposite direction. Many casualties from going out during this calm.
- Roofs first: Tarping is more urgent than almost anything else. Every hour of delay irreversibly worsens interior damage.
- Power lines: Fallen poles and cables on the ground remain energized. Never approach them.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Needs inventory by neighborhood: roofs, water, electricity |
Collective kitchens (no more gas or electricity) |
Support for insurance/government aid |
| Generator fuel (refrigerated items, oxygen therapy) |
Muck & gut with DAUSA if available |
Global Grant infrastructure reconstruction |
| Distribution of tarps/water/food |
Generators for vulnerable families |
Training in hurricane-resistant construction |
|
Provisional repairs (windows, doors, roofs) |
Complete stewardship with before/after photos |
|
Volunteer rotation every 48-72 h |
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Before and after impact |
Pre-impact possible |
| ShelterBox |
Tarps, tents, survival kits |
From D+1 |
| DAUSA |
Muck & gut, debris removal |
From D+3 |
| DNA-RAG |
Technical coordination |
Immediate |
| Global Grant |
Infrastructure reconstruction |
3-6 months |
B2, FLOOD
|
|
| Code |
B2, Family B: Meteorological |
| Speed |
Rapid (flash flood: minutes) or slow (plain flood: days) |
| Lead time |
Minutes to days depending on type |
| Duration |
Hours to weeks |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, groundwater contamination, epidemiological risks |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify members living in flood-prone areas (local risk map)
- Stocks of water purification tablets (chlorine), portable filters
- Waders and gloves for intervention teams
- Identify residents on ground floors/basements for preventive evacuation
- Preventive evacuation of identified flood-prone areas, before water rises
- NEVER cross on foot: 15 cm of flowing water knocks down an adult
- NEVER cross by car: 60 cm of water sweeps away a vehicle
- Cut electricity to homes being flooded
- Help vulnerable persons (elderly, people with reduced mobility, infants) reach upper floors/high ground
- Call-down list from a safe high area
- Alert the District: DCA depending on scale
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Flood water = toxic: Sewage, chemicals, sharp debris, pathogens. Contact = full protection (boots, gloves, no open wounds).
- Premature returns: Structures weakened by saturation, short circuits, toxic molds developed.
- Leptospirosis: Rodent urine in flood waters, fatal. Symptoms 2-30 days after exposure.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery |
| Emergency drinking water: bottled or treated |
Pumping/drying of buildings |
Full disinfection of homes before reoccupation |
| High-ground gathering points + registration of families |
Water filters and purification tablets on a large scale |
Support for damage assessment (insurance) |
| Boats if available, evacuation of isolated persons |
Cleaning/disinfection of dwellings (mud, mold) |
Global Grant water/sanitation systems |
| Epidemiological surveillance with health authorities |
Leptospirosis surveillance (fever + pain) |
Reforestation, community dikes (ESRAG) |
| Hygiene kits (soap, gel, chlorine tablets) |
Disinfection of wells/water points (WASH-RAG) |
|
| DRG for water, hygiene, shelters |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Drinking water, hygiene, shelters |
48-72 h |
| WASH-RAG |
Water purification, sanitation |
From D+1 |
| Global Grant |
Water/sanitation infrastructure |
3-6 months |
B3, COLD WAVE / SNOWSTORM
|
|
| Code |
B3, Family B: Meteorological |
| Speed |
Progressive |
| Lead time |
24-72 hours |
| Duration |
Days to weeks |
| Affected area |
Regional, hypothermia, frostbite, CO poisoning, network outages |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Stock of survival blankets, fleeces, warm clothing (various sizes)
- Map isolated elderly persons in the club's area
- Identify heated premises as warming centers (hall, gym, member's business)
- "Cold" kits: hot drink thermoses, hot water bottles, blankets, gloves, hats
- Raise awareness about the dangers of carbon monoxide (CO)
FIRST 6 HOURS, Cold's arrival
- Open warming centers as soon as the local danger threshold is reached
- Neighborhood network: each member calls 5 elderly/isolated neighbors
- Distribute warm kits to the homeless and vulnerable persons
- Transport isolated persons to warming centers
- Systematic CO alert: never a generator indoors, nor a barbecue as heating
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Silent CO: Odorless, colorless, deadly. Absolute ban on any combustion device in enclosed space (generator, barbecue, brazier).
- Elderly persons: Thermoregulation degrades with age. An elderly person may be hypothermic without shivering or complaining.
- Frozen pipes: Bursting causes water damage upon thawing. Anticipate repairs.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (during the wave) |
After the wave |
| Warming center 24/7 coverage on rotation |
Continued daily check on vulnerable persons |
Safe return of hosted persons |
| Distribution of hot meals (soup, drinks) |
Coordination with fire services/EMS for hypothermia |
Water damage repairs (burst pipes) |
| Daily check on vulnerable persons (morning + evening visit) |
Help for families without heating: alternative accommodation |
Psychological assessment of exposed elderly persons |
| Help with emergency repairs to frozen pipes |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Warming material, housing |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Heated premises, transport |
Immediate |
B4, HEAT WAVE
|
|
| Code |
B4, Family B: Meteorological |
| Speed |
Progressive |
| Lead time |
24-72 hours |
| Duration |
Days to weeks |
| Affected area |
Regional, silent deaths of elderly persons, infants, chronically ill |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Map isolated elderly persons and housing without air conditioning
- Identify air-conditioned premises as cooling centers
- Stock of water bottles, misters, portable fans
- Know the signs of heat stroke: confusion, dry/hot skin, loss of consciousness
FIRST 6 HOURS, Upon exceeding the alert threshold
- Open cooling centers (air-conditioned premises of the club/members)
- Neighborhood network: call or visit isolated elderly persons (morning AND evening)
- Distribute drinking water to immobile vulnerable persons
- Reminder of guidelines: drink without waiting for thirst, stay in the shade, avoid effort during hot hours
- Identify persons on at-risk medications
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Silent death: Death from heat stroke at night, poorly ventilated housing. Victims do not ask for help. Physical visit is essential.
- Aggravating medications: Diuretics, antihypertensives, antidepressants, antiparkinson drugs alter thermoregulation. Persons on treatment = very high risk.
- Night without cooling: Nighttime temperature is the most decisive mortality factor.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Heat peak |
Stabilization |
After the wave |
| Cooling center coverage + volunteer rotation |
Continued monitoring of vulnerable persons |
Hospitalized/deceased assessment, report to District |
| Cold/light meals (avoid cooking efforts) |
Coordination with health authorities/EMS |
Support for bereaved families |
| Transport of vulnerable persons to centers |
Increased nighttime surveillance |
Advocacy for insulation, ventilation, greening |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Water, fans, transport |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Air-conditioned premises, volunteers |
Immediate |
B5, TORNADO
|
|
| Code |
B5, Family B: Meteorological |
| Speed |
Sudden (impact within minutes; official EF scale, Enhanced Fujita: EF0 105-137 km/h to EF5 > 322 km/h, NWS) |
| Lead time |
Minutes: watch ("tornado watch") issued hours ahead, warning ("tornado warning") 10-15 min on average, sometimes zero |
| Duration |
Minutes (passage) + days to weeks (aftermath) |
| Affected area |
Narrow corridor (width often < 1 km, track of a few km); spring-summer peak in North America ("Tornado Alley", "Dixie Alley"), but possible anywhere, including Europe; projectiles, collapses, power lines |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify a shelter for each meeting place and each member household: interior room without windows on the lowest level, ideally a cellar or basement; NEVER a mobile home, even anchored
- NOAA Weather Radio and cell alerts enabled for all members in exposed areas
- Train members to tell the difference: "tornado watch" (favorable conditions, stay alert) vs "tornado warning" (tornado detected, take shelter IMMEDIATELY)
- Emergency kit in the shelter: water, flashlight, battery radio, helmets or cushions (head protection)
- Regular shelter drills: reaching the shelter must take less than 2 minutes
- Call-down list: locate all members, count present/missing
- Post-impact danger no. 1: downed power lines, gas leaks, nail-studded debris. Thick boots, gloves, never touch a cable
- Search for victims organized WITH the authorities only, no improvised USAR in the rubble (see card D5)
- Safety perimeter around unstable structures (partially collapsed walls and roofs)
- Systematic photo documentation of the damage for the assessment (DRG, insurance)
- Alert the District: DCA depending on scale, DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Sheltering under a bridge or overpass: a deadly trap. The venturi effect accelerates the wind and projectiles there. In a car with no shelter accessible: a ditch, lying flat, hands over the head.
- Fleeing by car in an urban area or filming instead of sheltering: a tornado's path is unpredictable and traffic locks up. Every minute spent filming is a minute of shelter lost.
- Believing "it doesn't happen here": false. Tornadoes strike Europe, Asia, Australia, not only the great American plains. Preparation is worthwhile everywhere.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 d) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Tarping priority: tarp damaged roofs before the next rains |
Debris removal coordinated with the authorities (nail-studded debris, PPE) |
Support with insurance/government aid |
| Distribution of water, food, tarps along the impact corridor |
Housing for families without shelter |
Global Grant reconstruction if collective facilities destroyed |
| Mobilize unaffected neighboring clubs (narrow impact zone) |
VOAD/authorities coordination to avoid duplication |
Advocacy for safe rooms and shelters |
| Launch DRG (25,000 USD) with rapid assessment report |
Volunteer rotation |
Full stewardship, before/after photos |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Tarps, water, emergency housing |
48-72 h |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Narrow impact corridor: clubs 20 km away are intact and mobilizable, THE tornado-specific advantage |
Immediate |
| ShelterBox |
Rarely activated for a localized tornado; consider only if destruction is widespread |
From Day+2 |
| Club funds |
Immediate aid to affected families |
Immediate |
B6, DAM / HYDRAULIC STRUCTURE FAILURE
|
|
| Code |
B6, Family B: Hydrological (structure failure: dam, dike, mine tailings dam). Classified in family B for the flood wave, but the triggering hazard may be technological (structural defect) |
| Speed |
Sudden: the flood wave can reach several meters in height and travel at 10-30 km/h along the valley floor, with very little delay in the immediate downstream area |
| Lead time |
None to a few minutes in the immediately downstream area; from a few tens of minutes to a few hours further down. Large dams in principle have a Special Intervention Plan (PPI) with "foghorn"-type sirens: recognizing this signal = evacuate to high ground immediately |
| Duration |
Minutes (passage of the wave) + weeks to months (mud, contamination, destruction of networks) |
| Affected area |
Valley downstream of the structure, over kilometers. Mine tailings dams (toxic residues): Brumadinho (Brazil, 25 January 2019, failure of the Córrego do Feijão tailings dam, 270 deaths), Mariana / Fundão (Brazil, 2015, 19 deaths, pollution of the Rio Doce). Historical cases: Vajont (Italy, 1963, wave caused by a landslide into the reservoir, ~2,000 deaths), Malpasset (France, 1959, ~420 deaths) |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify whether the club is located downstream of a dam, a dike or a mine tailings basin, and obtain the map of the floodable zone (PPI, regulatory maps)
- Learn to recognize the PPI warning signal ("foghorn" siren) and circulate the single instruction: immediately reach high ground, do not try to cross the valley
- Identify in advance the high refuge points and the evacuation routes toward the upper slopes
- For mine tailings basins: understand that the wave carries toxic residues (tailings mud, heavy metals), plan for masks, gloves, clean decontamination water
- Build up a stock of bottled water: after a failure, well and network water is massively contaminated
- Rescuer safety first: never enter the flooded zone before confirmation that the structure is stabilized (a failure may continue or worsen)
- Confirm that all members in the floodable zone have reached high ground; call-down list for registration
- Alert and coordinate with the prefecture / civil protection authority steering the PPI; do not bypass the official chain
- Do not enter the tailings mud (entrapment + toxicity); leave the search for victims to the equipped teams
- Systematic photo documentation for the assessment (DRG, insurance, operator liability)
- Alert the District: DCA depending on scale, DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Returning to the valley floor too early: the wave may arrive in several surges and the damaged structure may fail further. Wait for the official all-clear.
- Treating the mud like an ordinary flood: for a mine tailings dam (Brumadinho type), the mud is toxic and behaves like a fluid that solidifies; it traps people and machines. PPE mandatory, never bare-skin contact.
- Water assumed to be drinkable: wells, boreholes and the network are contaminated (bacteria, hydrocarbons, heavy metals). Distribute only bottled or certified water until analysis.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Emergency housing for evacuees on high ground |
Distribution of drinking water (networks destroyed or contaminated) |
Support for families toward compensation (operator, State) |
| Distribution of bottled water, food, hygiene kits |
Support for mud clearing under supervision, with PPE |
Global Grant reconstruction of a destroyed collective facility |
| Registration of missing persons, support for families |
Psychological support (trauma, grief, total loss) |
Advocacy for structure safety and risk mapping (ESRAG) |
| Launch DRG with rapid assessment report |
WASH-RAG to restore safe water |
Stewardship, before/after photos and financial follow-up |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Water, housing, emergency hygiene kits |
48-72 h |
| WASH-RAG |
Restore drinking water in a contaminated zone |
From D+1 |
| ShelterBox |
Housing if destruction is widespread downstream |
From D+2 |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Spared neighboring valleys: logistical relay |
Immediate |
C1, DROUGHT
|
|
| Code |
C1, Family C: Progressive climatic |
| Speed |
Very slow (weeks to months) |
| Lead time |
Progressive indicators (vegetation indices, groundwater) |
| Duration |
Months to years |
| Affected area |
Regional, food, water, livestock, rural economy, child nutrition |
BEFORE, Early warning indicators
- Track vegetation indices and groundwater levels (official indicators)
- Identify vulnerable farming communities in the club's area
- Local veterinary service contacts (first signal: livestock deaths)
- Assessment of households in food and water insecurity (field visit)
- Distribution of drinking water to villages in shortage (tanker trucks, coordination with city halls)
- Targeted food distribution: children < 5 years, pregnant/breastfeeding women, elderly
- Support farmers with drought-adapted seeds
- Alert District for DRG if > 100 families affected
- Contact WASH-RAG for sustainable water solutions
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Waiting too long: Chronic child malnutrition causes irreversible effects on cognitive development. Act at the first signs.
- Distributing without targeting: Untargeted distributions rarely benefit the most vulnerable. Identify priority households with the communities.
- Neglecting livestock: Often the entire economy of a rural household. Livestock death precipitates famine.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Progressive phase |
Aggravated phase |
Recovery |
| Emergency drinking water for villages |
Food for Work (FFW): paying in food |
Rainwater harvesting (cisterns, small dikes) |
| Targeted food (children, pregnant women) |
Emergency veterinary support for livestock |
Water-efficient agriculture training (drip irrigation) |
| Drought-adapted seeds |
Monitor migration to cities (signal of worsening) |
Reforestation of degraded areas (ESRAG) |
| DRG if > 100 families |
Global Grant boreholes/cisterns |
Database of vulnerable areas |
| WASH-RAG water solutions |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Emergency water and food |
48-72 h |
| Global Grant |
Boreholes, cisterns, irrigation |
3-6 months |
| WASH-RAG |
Sustainable water solutions |
Medium term |
| ESRAG |
Reforestation, climate resilience |
Medium term |
C2, WILDFIRE
|
|
| Code |
C2, Family C: Environmental |
| Speed |
Very fast (hundreds of hectares in hours) |
| Lead time |
Minutes to hours |
| Duration |
Hours to weeks + 24-48 h resurgence |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, total loss of property, long-distance toxic smoke |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Stock of FFP2/N95 masks (smoke = fine particles + toxic compounds)
- Identify members in wildland-urban interface zones
- Know secondary evacuation routes (main ones often blocked)
- Immediate evacuation at the first official alert, do not wait to see the fire
- DO NOT take time to gather belongings, leave immediately
- Close windows and doors (slows smoke and embers)
- Shut off gas supply to vacated buildings
- Wear FFP2 mask as soon as smoke is visible
- Call-down list from a secure area outside the perimeter
- Alert the District
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Burned buildings: Heat weakens concrete and metal. Possible collapse hours after extinction. Never enter without structural assessment.
- Toxic materials: Fires release asbestos, heavy metals, toxins. Ash dangerous to handle without protection.
- Resurgence: A fire declared extinguished can resume 24-48 h later due to wind. Do not announce the end of the crisis prematurely.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization |
Recovery |
| Emergency housing centers for evacuees (duration: weeks) |
DO NOT return to burned buildings without structural assessment |
Global Grant reconstruction of collective facilities |
| Respiratory masks (smoke persists days after extinction) |
Help with respiratory disease care |
Adapted reforestation (less flammable species, ESRAG) |
| Drinking water (networks melted/contaminated by ash) |
Coordination with authorities on zone-by-zone return permits |
Training in preventive brush clearing |
| Recovery of lost documents (civil status, insurance) |
Administrative support: claims, government aid |
|
| Psychological support: total loss of property = major shock |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Shelters, masks, water |
48-72 h |
| ShelterBox |
Housing for evacuees |
From D+2 |
| ESRAG |
Adapted reforestation |
Medium term |
| Global Grant |
Collective reconstruction |
3-6 months |
C3, LOCUST / PEST INVASION
|
|
| Code |
C3, Family C: Environmental (agricultural biological scourge) |
| Speed |
Slow on the scale of the crisis (weeks to months of buildup) but very rapid local destruction: an adult swarm travels up to 150 km per day and devours each day the equivalent of its own mass in vegetation |
| Lead time |
Several weeks if monitoring exists. The FAO runs a global desert locust warning service (Desert Locust Watch) with regular bulletins; the official phases range from "recession" to "resurgence", "outbreak", then "invasion". The shift from the solitary phase to the gregarious phase is the major warning signal |
| Duration |
An invasion campaign can last from several months to a few years (several successive generations) |
| Affected area |
Regional to transboundary. Desert locust: West Africa / Sahel belt, Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Southwest Asia. 2019-2021 episode in East Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia): the worst invasion in decades, a direct threat to the food security of millions of people |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Track the warning bulletins of the FAO (Desert Locust Watch) and of national plant protection services, relay the information to the farming communities in the club's area
- Identify vulnerable agricultural and pastoral areas and the crops to protect as a priority (cereals, fodder)
- Train members in early reporting (geolocation of egg-laying and larval bands to the official services): control is effective on ground larvae, very difficult on adult swarms in flight
- Build up contacts with the agricultural and veterinary services and the anti-locust control brigades (which hold the approved pesticides)
- Plan the nutrition component: an invasion translates into food insecurity a few weeks to months later
- Report any swarm or larval band observed to the official anti-locust control services (location, size, stage)
- Rescuer safety: never take part in pesticide spraying without PPE or training. Anti-locust products are toxic; spraying is reserved for equipped brigades
- Do not allow consumption of locusts fallen after chemical treatment (poisoning risk)
- Logistical support to the official brigades (transport, spotting) rather than improvised control
- Registration of threatened farms to anticipate food aid
- Alert the District if more than 100 farming families are threatened: DRG prepared
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Ineffective improvised control: burning tires, making noise or beating adult swarms does not stop them. Only the early treatment of ground larvae by the equipped services is effective. Focus the club's effort on reporting and nutrition.
- Mishandled pesticides: spraying without PPE, contamination of water and livestock, consumption of treated insects. Leave the chemistry to the approved brigades.
- Waiting for famine: the loss of harvests turns into a nutritional crisis a few weeks later. Prepare the food response as soon as the crop loss is observed, do not wait for the first cases of malnutrition.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Buildup phase (weeks) |
Destruction phase (crops lost) |
Recovery |
| Relay FAO/service alerts to communities |
Assessment of food-insecure households |
Distribution of seeds for the next season |
| Organized reporting of larval bands |
Targeted feeding: children < 5 years, pregnant/breastfeeding women |
Support for rebuilding livestock and stocks |
| Logistical support to control brigades |
Food for Work (FFW) for households deprived of harvest |
Database of vulnerable areas |
| Registration of threatened farms |
Launch DRG if > 100 families affected |
Global Grant food security (silos, irrigation) |
|
WASH-RAG and veterinary support if pastoralism is affected |
Reforestation and land management (ESRAG) |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Emergency food aid to families deprived of harvest |
48-72 h |
| Global Grant |
Lasting food security: seeds, silos, irrigation |
3-6 months |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Spared districts: financial and logistical support |
Short term |
| ESRAG |
Agricultural resilience and land management |
Medium term |
D1, HAZMAT EXPLOSION
|
|
| Code |
D1, Family D: Technological |
| Speed |
Instantaneous (explosion) + cloud spread (hours) |
| Lead time |
None |
| Duration |
Hours to days (residual contamination: weeks) |
| Affected area |
Local, invisible chemical/biological/radiological contamination zone |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify at-risk industrial sites (SEVESO, fuel depots, chemical plants)
- Know the local emergency plan (ORSEC-TMD, PPI)
- Identify members: doctors, nurses, volunteer firefighters, chemical engineers
- Move away from the area, the toxic cloud follows prevailing winds
- DO NOT approach to "help": without specialized PPE, each rescuer = additional victim
- Shelter in place if cloud approaches: windows closed, ventilation off
- Follow exclusively the instructions of the authorities (specialized firefighters, EMS)
- Call-down list to locate members in the danger zone
- Alert the District
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Rescue reflex: The instinct to rush to help kills in HAZMAT. Wait for specialized authorities.
- Secondary contamination: Persons coming out of the zone must be decontaminated before being approached. Risk to helpers.
- Invisible cloud: Some chemicals are odorless and colorless. Rely solely on official measurements, not the senses.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization |
Recovery |
| Reception/housing for evacuees outside the perimeter |
Coordination of return to safe areas |
Long-term psychological support |
| Distribution of water, food, hygiene |
Support for economically affected families |
Advocacy for industrial safety |
| Psychological support for victims' families |
Medical follow-up of exposed persons |
|
| Only verified official information relayed |
|
|
| Member doctors: medical support for evacuees |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Housing, food for evacuees |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Doctors, logistics |
Immediate |
D2, NUCLEAR ACCIDENT / RADIOLOGICAL
|
|
| Code |
D2, Family D: Technological |
| Speed |
Progressive (release can last days) |
| Lead time |
Variable (minutes to hours depending on type of accident) |
| Duration |
Days (accident), years (contamination, displacement) |
| Affected area |
Regional, invisible contamination, prolonged displacement (e.g., Fukushima: > 15 years) |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Know the nuclear power plants and radioactive sites within 20 km (FR PPI evacuation zone) to 80 km (extended ingestion zone, equivalent to US NRC EPZ)
- Know the stable iodine tablet distribution plan (city halls)
- Know the procedure: shelter in place (confinement) vs. evacuation by zone
FIRST 6 HOURS, Upon official announcement
- Immediate shelter in place if recommended: close openings, cut ventilation, stay inside
- Take stable iodine tablets if distributed by authorities (protects thyroid)
- DO NOT go out to assess, radiological contamination is imperceptible
- Evacuation if ordered: official routes only
- Call-down list by SMS from the shelter
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Stable iodine vs. radioactive iodine: Iodine tablets must be taken before or just after exposure. They protect only the thyroid, not against other radionuclides.
- Premature normalization: Political/economic pressure for a rapid return to still-contaminated areas. Follow only official dosimetric data.
- Local food: DO NOT consume local water, vegetables, milk not certified safe by the authorities.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization |
Long term (months-years) |
| Help evacuees to declared safe zones only |
Verified information only (misinformation = danger) |
Ongoing psychological support (grief for living place) |
| DO NOT distribute uncertified local food |
Support for families with administrative procedures |
Global Grant medical follow-up for exposed populations |
| Psychological support: fear of invisible contamination |
|
Educational health projects for displaced communities |
|
|
Compensation support |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Help for evacuees in safe zones |
48-72 h |
| Global Grant |
Long-term medical follow-up |
3-6 months |
D3, BLACKOUT
|
|
| Code |
D3, Family D: Technological |
| Speed |
Instantaneous |
| Lead time |
None (storm, cyberattack, cascading failure) |
| Duration |
Hours to days |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, all systems affected: water, heating/AC, care, communication, cold chain |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Identify members/relatives dependent on electrical medical devices (dialysis, respirator, insulin)
- Inventory generators available from members
- Identify a community center equippable with a generator
- Stock of lamps, batteries, candles
- Vital priority: contact persons dependent on medical devices (dialysis, respirator, refrigerated insulin)
- Direct medical needs to hospitals with generators
- Inventory and lend generators to vulnerable persons
- Open a lit community center as a gathering point
- Systematic CO alert: never a generator indoors
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- CO kills silently: Generators indoors = death. Only outside, > 6 m (20 feet) from any opening (CDC, CPSC).
- Insulin and thermosensitive medications: Insulin is normally stable for 28 days at ambient temperature below 30 °C (FDA, ADA), but degradation is accelerated in heat waves or non-air-conditioned rooms. In a summer blackout, organize cold access within 48 h for diabetics.
- Water: Water network pumps no longer work. Water may stop flowing or lose its treatment pressure.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 24 hours |
Beyond 24 h |
Return of electricity |
| Priority contact with persons with medical devices |
Cold chain: distribute/store refrigerated medicines/food |
Verification of electrical equipment damage |
| Generators to vulnerable persons |
Lamps, candles, backup batteries |
Assessment of affected persons |
| Lit community center |
CO risk information |
District report |
|
Coordination of priority fuel deliveries |
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Generators, fuel, water |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Generators, premises, transport |
Immediate |
D4, TRANSPORT ACCIDENT (MASS)
|
|
| Code |
D4, Family D: Technological |
| Speed |
Instantaneous |
| Lead time |
None |
| Duration |
Hours (impact), days (victim and family management) |
| Affected area |
Localized, numerous simultaneous victims, complex identification, media |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Know the mass casualty protocols (ORSEC Novi or equivalent)
- Identify premises available for family reception
- Identify members speaking foreign languages (frequent international victims)
- Trigger official rescue services and stay outside the safety perimeter
- Support to rescuers: lighting, water, supplies for medical teams
- Family reception point for victims' families: available premises, dedicated volunteers
- DO NOT photograph/film victims (dignity, disruption of rescue)
- Emergency psychological support for uninjured survivors in shock
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Spontaneous volunteer surge: Spectacular accident = hundreds of volunteers. Without coordination, they hinder rescue. The club organizes and channels, does not join anarchically.
- Media: Single spokesperson. No statement on causes or responsibilities. Never comment on the official casualty toll.
- Non-local families: Often coming from far away, without local resources. Housing, transport, food must be planned.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization |
Recovery |
| Coordination of psychological support teams |
Support for families with administrative procedures |
Long-term psychological support |
| Logistics for families from afar: housing, transport |
Help with victim identification (translation) |
Memorial ceremony if appropriate |
| District communication |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| Member network |
Logistics, premises, translation |
Immediate |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
If exceptional scale |
48-72 h |
D5, BUILDING COLLAPSE
|
|
| Code |
D5, Family D: Technological (origin: defect, decay, overload, sabotage) |
| Speed |
Instantaneous |
| Lead time |
None |
| Duration |
Seconds (impact), survival window under rubble: 72 h |
| Affected area |
Localized, trapped victims, USAR expertise required |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Know local USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) and specialized rescue contacts
- Identify dilapidated buildings in the club's area
- Train members in logistical support for rescue teams
- Immediately alert official rescue services with precise location (specialized rescue, USAR)
- Strict safety perimeter: rubble may collapse further
- DO NOT attempt rescue without USAR training
- Logistical support to rescuers: lighting, water for rescuers, witness registration
- Lists of potentially trapped persons (help families identify occupants)
- Call-down list to identify members potentially present
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Improvised rescues: Pulling a survivor without assessing stability can trigger a secondary collapse, killing both survivor and rescuer.
- Secondary victims: Distress of families waiting. Provide volunteers dedicated exclusively to family support, separate from logistics teams.
- Cascade collapse: Adjacent buildings may be weakened. Extended perimeter.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization |
Recovery |
| Psychological support for families awaiting news |
Emergency housing for displaced occupants |
DRG emergency rehousing of families |
| Rest/refreshment area for rescue teams |
Help with administrative procedures (housing, insurance) |
Global Grant if collective infrastructure |
| Coordination of funeral services in case of deaths |
Official communication single information point |
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Emergency rehousing |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Logistics, housing |
Immediate |
D6, TERRORIST ATTACK / MASS VIOLENCE
|
|
| Code |
D6, Family D: Technological / security (act of intentional violence: terrorist attack, mass killing, hostage-taking) |
| Speed |
Instantaneous, no warning |
| Lead time |
None |
| Duration |
Minutes (the event) + days to weeks (investigation, mourning, ongoing threat); the risk of a second device or of a follow-up attack targeting the rescuers may persist for several hours |
| Affected area |
Pinpoint but heavily judicialized: the area becomes a crime scene sealed off by the authorities; a very broad psychological shockwave (community, city, country) |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Understand that, for this type of event, the club's role is in rear support (families, housing, logistics) and never on the security front line
- Identify in advance the victim support units, the medical-psychological support services (CUMP in France) and the authorities' "family" liaison officers
- Train members in the principle of the sealed zone: nothing is touched, nothing is moved, nothing is cleaned without the investigators' agreement
- Prepare a crisis communication doctrine: a single spokesperson, validated messages, no release of a casualty toll or of detail
- Rescuer safety: stay outside the perimeter, keep away from the scene as long as the authorities have not declared it safe (risk of a second device, of an attacker still active). Never approach to "help" or to film
- Make yourselves available to the official command post and wait for a precise mission; do not undertake anything independently on site
- Open, if requested by the authorities, a reception and comfort area for relatives, away from the scene
- Call-down list: account for members, check that none is involved in or caught up in the event
- Alert President and Disaster Coordinator; alert the District (DCA depending on scale, DRG prepared)
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Judicial perimeter: the area is a crime scene. Any unauthorized intervention (moving a body, cleaning, picking up an object) destroys evidence and is liable to prosecution. Touch nothing without the investigators' approval.
- Communication under investigation: never release a casualty toll, a victim's identity, or detail on the modus operandi or the perpetrator. Refer strictly to official statements. A rumor relayed by a club can hinder the investigation and hurt the families.
- Second device / follow-up attack: perpetrators sometimes target rescuers and post-attack gatherings. Do not create a crowd of volunteers on site.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Reception area for relatives, away from the scene |
Medium-term psychological support, referral to the official units |
Support for families toward compensation and victim aid |
| Logistical support for families (meals, transport, housing) |
Coordination with victim support associations |
Memorial and cohesion actions validated with the authorities |
| Controlled communication: a single spokesperson, validated messages |
Watch on rumors and denials relayed from official sources |
Stewardship of the support fund collected |
| Launch DRG if material aid to families is needed |
Volunteer rotation (heavy emotional load) |
Global Grant only if collective facilities destroyed |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Immediate material aid to victims' families |
48-72 h |
| Club funds |
Direct and discreet support to families |
Immediate |
| Member network |
Housing, transport, support for relatives |
Immediate |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Reinforcement of fresh volunteers and donations |
Short term |
D7, CROWD CRUSH / STAMPEDE
|
|
| Code |
D7, Family D: Technological / security (crowd management failure, crush, stampede) |
| Speed |
Instantaneous: a deadly crush forms in a few tens of seconds once critical density is reached |
| Lead time |
None in the moment, but warning signs exist: density exceeding ~4-5 persons per square meter, wave-like movements in the crowd, bottlenecks. Beyond this threshold, the crowd becomes a fluid and individuals no longer control their movements |
| Duration |
Minutes (the crush) + days to weeks (injured, mourning, investigation) |
| Affected area |
Pinpoint: compression point (entrance, exit, staircase, bridge, ticket window, distribution point). The vast majority of deaths are caused by compressive asphyxia, standing, not by being trampled |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Map, for any gathering or distribution organized by the club, the possible compression points (single entrances, bottlenecks, staircases) and remove them or double them
- Set a maximum capacity per zone and plan one-way, wide flows with no dead ends
- Train members to spot critical density (~4 persons/m² = vigilance, beyond = danger) and to immediately stop entries
- Provide several exit points and clear signage; never concentrate a queue on a single door
- Historical reference cases: Hillsborough (Sheffield, 1989, 97 deaths by compression), Love Parade (Duisburg, 2010, 21 deaths in a bottleneck tunnel), the Hajj crush at Mina (2015)
- Rescuer safety: do not throw yourself into the compressed mass. You do not "pull" people out; you decompress by stopping the incoming flows and opening lateral escapes
- Immediately cut off any new arrival toward the saturated zone; open all available exits
- Alert the rescue services (numerous injured by asphyxia/compression, often conscious at first then in distress)
- Clear space: the vital priority is to reduce density, not to give first aid at the center of the mass
- Call-down list and registration of members involved in the organization
- Alert the District and the Disaster Coordinator (DCA depending on scale)
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Rotary distribution points (POD) anti-crush protocol: a distribution attracts a pressing, hungry crowd, which creates exactly the crush risk. Mandatory instructions for any POD: single queue channeled by soft barriers, sufficient width, never a bottleneck or a single door; several parallel queues rather than one; a ticket or time-slot system to smooth the influx; announce clearly that there is enough stock for everyone (the rumor of shortage triggers the rush); never launch a distribution from a balcony or a truck toward a crowd massed below; a dedicated member monitors density and has the authority to stop the distribution.
- Pulling victims toward you: worsens the compression. The only way out is to reduce the overall pressure (stop the flows, open lateral exits).
- Underestimating a "calm" crowd: the crush occurs without panic or riot, by sheer density. A still, dense crowd is already in danger.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Support to rescuers: triage, stretcher-carrying out of the zone, comfort to the injured |
Psychological support to survivors and witnesses |
Support for families (compensation, victim aid) |
| Reception area for families off to the side |
Coordination with victim support associations |
Lessons learned and overhaul of the club's POD protocols |
| Controlled communication, a single spokesperson, no premature casualty toll |
Cooperation with the investigation (the area may be judicialized) |
Training of the district's clubs in safe crowd management |
| Launch DRG if material aid is needed |
Volunteer rotation |
Advocacy for safe gatherings and distributions |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Aid to the injured and bereaved families |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Reception of families, logistics, transport |
Immediate |
| Club funds |
Direct support to victims |
Immediate |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Reinforcement of volunteers and donations |
Short term |
D8, CYBERATTACK ON ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
|
|
| Code |
D8, Family D: Technological (computer attack against a vital service: health, water, energy, telecoms, finance). Distinct from the physical blackout D3: here the cause is digital and malicious, electricity may be present but the systems are out of service |
| Speed |
Instantaneous once the attack is triggered (ransomware, system sabotage); discovery may be delayed by several hours or days |
| Lead time |
Generally none for the victim. Sector alerts may exist (in France, ANSSI and the CERTs issue alerts; generic threats tracked at the national level) |
| Duration |
Days to weeks: restoring a hospital system or a water network after ransomware often takes weeks; cascading effects on dependent services |
| Affected area |
Non-geographic at the outset (the targeted system) but very concrete physical consequences: a hospital switching to paper procedures, a water or sanitation station shut down, fuel distribution or payments blocked. Reference case: cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid (December 2015, actual power cut), ransomware that paralyzed hospitals |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Map the digital dependencies of the club and its territory: which vital services (hospital, water, payments) would fall and what to do then
- Plan a "no-digital" degraded mode for the club itself: paper call-down list, printed contact details, emergency cash, alternative means of communication
- Do not depend on a single channel: if telecoms or electronic payments go down, have a fallback solution
- Raise members' awareness of basic digital hygiene (passwords, phishing) so as not to become a vector oneself
- Identify the official liaisons: national cybersecurity authority (ANSSI/CERT type), crisis cell of the affected service
- "Rescuer" safety, digital version: never attempt to "repair" or reconnect the attacked system. The club is not the IT response team; any manipulation may destroy evidence or spread the attack
- The club's role: support the human and logistical consequences, not the IT. Coordinate with the crisis cell of the affected organization
- Immediately switch to paper/offline degraded mode for your own operations
- Help maintain essential local services: water, information to the population, reception of vulnerable persons dependent on the fallen services
- Beware of the disinformation that often accompanies these crises; relay only official messages
- Alert the District and the Disaster Coordinator (DCA depending on scale)
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Confusing it with a blackout (D3): here the electricity may work; it is the systems that are paralyzed. The response is not to find generators but to make up for the failing digital services (paper procedures, human information).
- Paying or negotiating the ransom, or touching the system: outside the club's role and competence. Refer strictly to the experts and the authorities; never improvise a technical response.
- Relaying panic and rumors: these crises come with disinformation. A club that relays a false instruction worsens the situation. Stick to verified official statements.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (3-14 days) |
Recovery (2 weeks, 6 months) |
| Switch the club to paper/offline degraded mode |
Extended support to services running in degraded mode (hospital, water) |
Lessons learned and strengthening of the club's continuity plan |
| Support for vulnerable persons deprived of services (health, payments) |
Verified information to the population, fight against rumors |
Awareness of cyber-resilience in the district |
| Relay only official messages |
Coordination with the crisis cell of the affected organization |
Help local structures rebuild their backup procedures |
| Launch DRG if local material aid is needed |
Volunteer rotation on the backup services |
Advocacy for continuity plans for essential services |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (ceiling in effect, see appendix A) |
Material aid to affected services and persons |
48-72 h |
| Member network |
Skills (IT specialists, caregivers), reliable information relay |
Immediate |
| Club funds |
Local support to the most vulnerable |
Immediate |
| Unaffected neighboring clubs |
Logistical and human support outside the affected zone |
Short term |
E1, EPIDEMIC/PANDEMIC
|
|
| Code |
E1, Family E: Health |
| Speed |
Exponential without barrier measures |
| Lead time |
Days to weeks (first cases detected) |
| Duration |
Weeks to years |
| Affected area |
Local to global, overflow of health systems, secondary crises |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Rotating PPE stocks: FFP2 masks, nitrile gloves, gowns, gel (renew before expiration)
- Club continuity plan (function if 30% of members are sick)
- Contacts with local public health officials
- Identify members who are health professionals
FIRST 6 HOURS, Upon local detection
- Preventive PPE distribution to health workers running out of stock
- Logistical support to health centers (transport, supplies, communication)
- Awareness campaign on barrier measures with health authorities (validated messages)
- Actively fight misinformation in the club network
- Alert District if scale exceeds local capacities
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Misinformation: Rumors spread as fast as the pathogen. Only relay information verified by health authorities. Sourced or silent.
- Sick volunteers: Sending symptomatic volunteers "for lack of staff" is counterproductive and dangerous. Quarantine without exception.
- Misused PPE: A poorly fitted FFP2 does not protect. Practical training on PPE wearing before any intervention.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Confirmed spread |
Stabilization / End of crisis |
Recovery |
| Adapt club activities to official health measures |
Vaccination campaigns with authorities (PolioPlus experience) |
Post-epidemic psychological support |
| Food aid for isolated/confined persons |
Help with economic recovery |
Lessons learned report |
| Support for caregivers: food, materials, psychological |
|
|
| Support for families of hospitalized patients |
|
|
| No unauthorized gatherings |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
PPE, food, health support |
48-72 h |
| WASH-RAG |
Drinking water, emergency sanitation |
From D+1 |
| PolioPlus (experience) |
Vaccination, awareness |
Immediate |
| Global Grant |
Long-term health infrastructure |
3-6 months |
F1, WAR / ARMED CONFLICT
|
|
| Code |
F1, Family F: Human |
| Speed |
Variable (progressive or sudden escalation) |
| Lead time |
Variable |
| Duration |
Months to years |
| Affected area |
Regional, direct danger, destroyed civilian systems, massive displacement |
BEFORE, Club positioning
- Written policy of political neutrality communicated to all members
- Identify specialized humanitarian partners (ICRC, UNHCR, MSF, NRC)
- Update contact information for all members (their safety comes first)
- Check the safety of ALL members via call-down list
- Support members evacuating dangerous areas
- NO direct intervention in combat zones, direct toward specialized humanitarian actors
- NEVER display support for a side (risk of targeting the club)
- Discreet communications with the District
- Help displaced populations only in declared safe areas
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Perception of bias: Helping in an area controlled by one side = interpreted as support. Operate with official authorization and transparency.
- Fake humanitarian corridors: Some are not secure. Never enter a conflict zone without coordination with ICRC or experienced humanitarians.
- Member safety: The safety of Rotarians comes before any humanitarian action.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Active phase (safe zones) |
Relative stabilization |
Post-conflict |
| Aid for displaced persons in safe zones: food, shelter, hygiene |
Needs documentation for Global Grants |
Global Grant civilian reconstruction (water, education, health) |
| Unaccompanied children → UNICEF, Save the Children |
Basic medical aid via Rotarian health professionals (secured zone) |
Long-term psychological support (war trauma) |
|
|
Reconciliation with RAGFP and Peace Fellows |
|
|
Vocational training for former combatants/displaced persons |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Aid for displaced persons in safe zones |
48-72 h |
| RAGFP |
Coordination of refugees, reconciliation, mediation |
Medium term to post-conflict |
| Global Grant |
Civilian reconstruction |
Post-conflict |
F2, REFUGEES / MASS DISPLACEMENT
|
|
| Code |
F2, Family F: Human |
| Speed |
Variable (sudden or progressive flow) |
| Lead time |
Variable (days if conflict known, zero if sudden) |
| Duration |
Months to years |
| Affected area |
Local to regional, complex needs: emergency + sustainable integration |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Prior contact with refugee reception services (authorities, UNHCR, Red Cross)
- Identify members speaking foreign languages (critical asset)
- Identify spaces for temporary reception centers
FIRST 6 HOURS, Arrival of displaced persons
- Organized reception: registration point with simplified civil status
- Immediate needs: drinking water, food, temporary shelters, sanitation
- Safe separation for single women and unaccompanied minors (report to authorities)
- Medical triage call: medical emergencies, pregnant women, elderly
- Distribution of hygiene kits (towels, soap, toothbrush, blanket)
- Contact District for DRG and RAGFP coordination
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Human trafficking: Camps/centers = hunting grounds for trafficking networks. Report any suspicious behavior. Never an unknown adult alone with minors.
- Helper fatigue: Displacement lasts for months. Strict rotations and psychological support for teams.
- Assistance without dignity: Always involve displaced persons in decisions. They are not objects of charity.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| First 2 weeks |
Stabilization |
Long term |
| School enrollment for children: immediate contact with local schools |
WASH: sanitation in housing centers |
Vocational training (Global Grant) |
| Administrative regularization: referral to competent services |
Psychological support (displacement trauma, grief) |
Local integration or voluntary return |
| Language classes for adults (volunteer member teachers) |
|
Coordination with RAGFP + RAGCED expertise/funding |
|
|
Advocacy for dignified reception conditions |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Reception, water, food, shelters |
48-72 h |
| RAGFP |
Refugee expertise and coordination |
From D+1 |
| WASH-RAG |
Water and sanitation in camps |
From D+3 |
| Global Grant |
Training, integration, income |
3-6 months |
F3, FAMINE / FOOD CRISIS
|
|
| Code |
F3, Family F: Human |
| Speed |
Progressive (weeks to months) |
| Lead time |
IPC indicators available |
| Duration |
Months to years |
| Affected area |
Regional, more than 730 million people in chronic global undernourishment of whom approximately 280 million in acute food crisis IPC phase 3+ (FAO SOFI 2024, WFP GRFC 2024), children most vulnerable |
BEFORE, Specific preparation
- Track IPC indicators (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification)
- Contacts with WFP (World Food Programme) and specialized NGOs
- Identify the most vulnerable areas and populations in the club's area
- Validate the crisis through official IPC indicators
- Field assessment with local partners: households, areas, vulnerable groups
- Nutritionally adapted targeted food distribution (children < 5 years, pregnant women)
- RUTF (ready-to-use therapeutic food) for severely malnourished children
- Coordination with WFP and specialized NGOs
- Immediate DRG for local food purchases (prefer local markets to imports)
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Adults at the expense of children: Uncontrolled distributions = weaker children eat less. Separate distributions for children < 5 years.
- Too rapid refeeding: Severely malnourished persons do not digest sudden normal nutrition. Refeeding syndrome = fatal. Work with health professionals.
- Social tensions: Food shortage generates conflicts over resources. Monitor and report.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| Progressive phase |
Acute phase (declared famine) |
Recovery |
| Targeted food distribution |
DRG local food purchases |
Global Grant agricultural projects |
| RUTF for severely malnourished children |
Coordination with District + Global Grants |
Rehabilitation of livelihoods |
| Coordination with WFP + NGOs |
Monitor social tensions (conflict risk) |
Training in resilient agricultural techniques |
| Continuous household assessment |
|
|
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Local food purchases |
48-72 h |
| Global Grant |
Agricultural projects, livelihoods |
3-6 months |
| WASH-RAG |
Water (drought often associated) |
Medium term |
| ESRAG |
Climate resilience, agriculture |
Medium term |
F4, COMPLEX MULTI-HAZARD CRISIS
Definition: superposition of two or three major stressors on the same population within a short time window. Documented examples: earthquake + epidemic (Turkey 2023), armed conflict + drought + famine (Sudan 2023-2024), floods + displacement + epidemic (Pakistan 2022), cyclone + pandemic (Philippines 2020). This is the typology that has been progressing the fastest since 2020.
CHARACTERISTICS
| Parameter |
Specificity |
| Trigger |
Cascade, a primary hazard (earthquake, conflict, drought) creates the conditions for the second (epidemic, displacement, famine) |
| Scale |
Multiplied by 3 to 10 compared to a single hazard |
| Duration |
6 months to several years |
| Actors |
Mandatory coordination among several OCHA clusters |
| Main pitfall |
Treating each crisis separately, interactions get forgotten |
BEFORE
- Identify cascade scenarios plausible for your territory (e.g., seismic zone + endemic epidemic; cyclone zone + food insecurity)
- Plan by combination, not by isolated hazard
- MOUs with health, WASH, food security actors, not just emergency rescue
- Diversified stocks (not everything in water, not everything in shelters)
FIRST 72 HOURS
- Identify the currently dominant stressor (the most urgent, not the most spectacular)
- Map interactions: does post-earthquake contaminated water create an epidemic risk? Do the displaced from the conflict put pressure on food stocks?
- Coordination from D+0 with all relevant clusters, not sequentially
- Enhanced SITREP, one section per stressor + one interactions section
CRITICAL PITFALLS
- Tunneling on the visible stressor: everyone films the earthquake, no one monitors the water. The epidemic arrives 3 weeks later and kills more than the earthquake.
- Competition between clusters: shelter vs. health vs. WASH, each one demands priority. Arbitrate quickly, with the DRO.
- Donor fatigue: a multi-hazard crisis lasts. Donations run out within 6-12 weeks. Plan the aftermath from D+30.
- Insufficient volunteer rotation: more than 6 months of operations = mandatory rotations every 14-21 days. Otherwise, collapse.
ACTIONS BY PHASE
| 72 hours |
Stabilization (week 2-8) |
Recovery (3 months+) |
| Mapping of stressors |
Daily inter-cluster coordination |
Multi-domain Global Grants (WASH + health + economic) |
| Prioritization of the most lethal |
Matrix SITREP (one per stressor) |
Resilience strengthening (cascade prevention) |
| DRG on the dominant stressor |
Supplementary DRG if new stressor |
Sustainable partnerships with specialized NGOs |
| OCHA coordination from D+0 |
ShelterBox + WASH-RAG + hunger response |
ESRAG (climate) + RAGCED (economy) |
| Tool |
Use |
Lead time |
| DRG (25,000 USD) |
Dominant stressor in emergency |
48-72 h |
| Secondary DRG |
Emerging stressor (epidemic, displacement) |
After reporting on the 1st DRG (recommended checkpoint: Day+45) |
| Multi-domain Global Grant |
Coordinated reconstruction health+WASH+economy |
3-6 months |
| DNA-RAG |
Essential central coordination |
< 24 h |
| WASH-RAG + hunger response + ESRAG |
Simultaneous activation by stressor type |
As needed |
| Zone Fund / TRF central |
Likely activation if multi-district |
Variable |
Rule: in a complex crisis, DNA-RAG is the recommended coordinator. Do not activate specialized RAGs in silos.
End of the 27 disaster cards. Print and file in your crisis kit the cards corresponding to the risks of your territory.